很多人資實務工作人員(受到老闆影響還是學校教的錯誤觀念？) 眼中只有$沒有人
Six Dangerous
Myths About Pay
Jeffrey Pfeffer
Every day, organizational leaders confront
decisions about pay.
Should they adjust the company's
compensation system to encourage some set of behaviors? Should they retain
consultants to help them implement a performance-based pay system?
How large a raise should they authorize?
In general terms, these kinds of questions
come down to four decisions about compensation:
- how much to pay employees;
- how much emphasis to place on financial compensation as a part of the total reward system;
- how much emphasis to place on attempting to hold down the rate of pay; and
- whether to implement a system of individual incentives to reward differences in performance and productivity and, if so, how much emphasis to place on these incentives.
Labor rates often appear to be a company's most
malleable financial variable. It seems a lot quicker and easier to cut wages
than to control costs in other ways, like reconfiguring manufacturing processes,
changing corporate culture, or altering product design. Because labor costs
appear to be the lever closest at hand, managers mistakenly assume it is the
one that has the most leverage.
呵，老闆如果只會算錢，底下精明的經理人也會耍手段(呈現自己的績效)，而基層員工也不是笨蛋一樣會算(絕大多數的員工是正職的肉體，Subcontractor的心靈)
賺錢難，用錢買到人心更難
Most merit-pay systems share two
attributes: they absorb vast amounts of management time and make everybody
unhappy.
欸，我之所以能把工作做好，是因為：
1.老闆不懂/不管(沒有妨礙我自得其樂)
2.公司人資自知自己在裝模作樣(假裝有在管，其實也沒礙事)
3.老天保佑(惜福感謝好運)
4.低調自我修煉(安貧樂道，自求人間道)
5.有自知的智慧，不妨礙夥伴做好本份
欸，我之所以能把工作做好，是因為：
1.老闆不懂/不管(沒有妨礙我自得其樂)
2.公司人資自知自己在裝模作樣(假裝有在管，其實也沒礙事)
3.老天保佑(惜福感謝好運)
4.低調自我修煉(安貧樂道，自求人間道)
5.有自知的智慧，不妨礙夥伴做好本份
If you could reliably measure and reward
individual contributions, organizations wouldn’t be needed.
成敗與權責的因果太複雜，所以才需要彼此信賴的大家組成團體，凡事如果都可以論功行賞、把每樣任務與績效進行拆解記點計分，那麼組織不會存在、也不需要組織(所以工作都外包就好，目前走上此一歧途的組織正是傳授知識與智慧的大專院校)
First, much to the surprise of people who
have spent too much time reading economics, empirical evidence from numerous
studies indicates that the extent of free riding is quite modest.
Second, individuals do not make decisions
about how much effort to expend in a social vacuum; they are influenced by peer
pressure and the social relations they have with their workmates.
Enchantment with individual merit pay reflects
not only the belief that people won't work effectively if they are not rewarded
for their individual efforts but also the related view that the road to solving
organizational problems is largely paved with adjustments to pay and
measurement practices.
360度績效考核是萬靈丹還是毒藥？
作者的建議
The first, and perhaps most obvious, suggestion
is that managers would do well to keep the difference between labor rates and
labor costs straight. In doing so, remember that only labor costs and not labor
rates - are the basis for competition, and that labor costs may not be a major
component of total costs.
In any event, managers should remember that
the issue is not just what you pay people, but also what they produce.
不要只看付出的人事成本，要想想這些人的產出與效益
Managers should see what happens when they
include a large dose of collective rewards in their employees' compensation
package. The more aggregated the unit used to measure performance, the more
reliably performance can be assessed. One can tell pretty accurately how well
an organization, or even a subunit, has done with respect to sales, profits,
quality, productivity, and the like. Trying to parcel out who, specifically,
was responsible for exactly how much of that productivity, quality, or sales is
frequently much more difficult or even impossible.
評量的應該是整個單位的績效，而非個人的貢獻(組織中的每個人是interdependent，無法分割單獨評量單獨個體的貢獻；衡量單獨的貢獻就會造成分工不合作！)。
Pay cannot substitute for a working
environment high on trust, fun, and meaningful work. If you came for money, you
would leave for money, and you wanted employees who were there because they liked
the work, the culture, and the people, not money-that every company could
offer. Emphasizing pay as the primary reward encourages people to come and to
stay for the wrong reason.
公司不要窮得只剩錢！應該要有文化、工作樂趣與讓人舒服的同事與環境（好高的期許與理想）。
Managers must also recognize that pay has
substantive and symbolic components. In signaling what and who in the
organization is valued, pay both reflects and helps determine the
organization's culture. Therefore, managers must make sure that the messages sent
by pay practices are intended. Managers must make sure that the messages sent
by pay practices are intended. Talking about teamwork and cooperation and then not
having a group-based component to the pay system matters because paying solely
on an individual basis signals what the organization believes is actually
important-individual behavior and
performance.
欸，很多老闆只是窮得只剩錢的老粗….不要只當灑錢的員外，給錢要說清楚原因，才能導正員工與孩子的價值觀
Making pay practices public also sends a
powerful symbolic message. Some organizations reveal pay distributions by
position or level. A few organizations, actually make data on individual pay
available to all members who are interested. Other organizations try to maintain
a high level of secrecy about pay. What message do those organizations send?
Keeping salaries secret suggests that the organization has something to hide or
that it doesn't trust its people with the information. Moreover, keeping things
secret just encourages people to uncover the secrets-if something is worth hiding,
it must be important and interesting enough to expend effort discovering. Pay
systems that are more open and transparent send a positive message about the
equity of the system and the trust that the company places in its people.
薪資及級距對於員工是很重要的資訊，資訊越不公開，其實讓員工越不相信公司
Actually talking to people about what is
important and why, rather than trying to send some subtle signals through the
compensation system!
直接告訴員工什麼是老闆與公司在意的，而非讓員工透過誰升官與加薪的決策來猜想
Perhaps most important, leaders must come
to see pay for what it is: just one element in a set of management practices
that can either build or reduce commitment, teamwork, and performance.
公司老闆自己要省思(而非讓人資奴才爬到金主頭上，然而有能力駕馭貌似專業人資奴才的主子並不多…)：薪水付出去到底換到了什麼？塑造什麼樣的組織文化與價值觀
追隨使用一般normal人資作法與觀念的公司不可能賺取abnormal的報酬。
Three Lessons Learned in This Article:
1.人資不是做得越多用細膩越好，而是不用虛耗能量在空轉與誤謬上
2.重點不是錢或成本，而是人=>用錢買到+套牢人心，再經由這些人的向心力來成就事業與塑造競爭優勢！
3.賺錢難省錢難(do
thing right)，懂得用錢更難(do the right thing)
Performance
Evaluation and Pay for Performance
Sara L. Rynes; Barry Gerhart; Laura Parks
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2005. 56:571–600
Three Motivation Theories
Maslow’s need hierarchy
theory (1943)
Maslow hypothesized that these higher-order
needs are more likely to be met through engagement in meaningful work than
through monetary rewards. Although Maslow did not view need satisfaction as an
all-or-nothing process (i.e., a person could simultaneously be motivated to
varying degrees by needs at different levels), the expectation was that on
average, all people progress through the hierarchy in roughly the same manner,
and that as people move up the hierarchy, pay becomes less important.
必須透過金錢來滿足低層的安全需求
Herzberg’s
motivation-hygiene theory(1957)
Herzberg posited that money was more likely
to be a “hygienic” factor—i.e., one capable of causing or reducing
dissatisfaction—than a satisfying or motivating one. Thus, Herzberg believed
that money played a role in creating or reducing dissatisfaction, but not in
contributing to satisfaction or motivation.
金錢只是保健因子，錢能使人推磨、但無法使人誠心誠意
Deci & Ryan’s cognitive
evaluation theory (CET, 1975)
CET argues that placing strong emphasis on monetary
rewards is likely to decrease people’s intrinsic interest (i.e., interest in
the work itself), thus dampening a potentially powerful alternative source of
motivation. Deci and his colleagues have tended to argue that the net effect of
monetary rewards on intrinsic interest is generally negative. However, Ryan et
al. (1983) propose that the overall effects of pay on intrinsic interest depend
on the information embedded in pay outcomes. Specifically, they argue that intrinsic
interest is likely to be impaired to the extent that information about rewards is
seen to be controlling. However, to the extent that pay provides meaningful information
regarding self-competence in contexts where people have discretion in choosing
how to perform tasks, then monetary rewards can actually increase intrinsic
interest. Thus, in statements of CET theory that are more complex, the net effect
of rewards on intrinsic interest depends on the relative impact of monetary rewards
on perceived control versus perceived self-competence.
金錢獎勵可以傷害也可以促進內在動機/成就感(爭辯中)
以上三個理論能見度很高，但實證上存在疑慮
“Split Roles” in Performance Evaluation
PE has two distinct functions: to develop
employees through such mechanisms as feedback and goal setting, and to evaluate
employees for purposes of making administrative decisions (e.g., pay increases
or promotions; Murphy & Cleveland 1995). Meyer and colleagues (1965) argued
that these two functions of performance appraisal should be kept completely
separate from one another—that is, evaluations of
performance and discussions of pay should be separated in time from discussions
of how to improve (or “develop”) performance.
“Interviews designed primarily to improve a person’s performance
should not at the same time weigh his or her salary or promotion in the balance.
. .. It seems foolish to have a manager serving the self-conflicting role as
counselor (helping someone improve performance) when, at the same time, he or
she is presiding as a judge over the same employee’s salary action” (Meyer et
al. 1989, p. 26).
Kluger & DeNisi’s Feedback Intervention Theory
FIs change the locus of attention among 3
general and hierarchically organized levels of control: task learning, task
motivation, and meta-tasks (including self-related) processes. The results
suggest that FI effectiveness decreases as attention moves up the hierarchy closer
to the self and away from the task. These findings are further moderated by
task characteristics that are still poorly understood
績效評估能否提升績效取決脈絡因素(當事人人格特質，管理風格)、任務情境(已知未知、能否自己決定目標或控制成敗)
Multisource (360-Degree) Performance Evaluation Research
Multi source feedback is seen as
potentially more useful than supervisor only evaluations in modern-day work
environments, which increasingly incorporate team-based production,
organizational structures that are more flat, and work organized around
horizontal rather than vertical flows. In addition, because 360-degree feedback
is gathered from multiple individuals, feedback reliability and validity may be
substantially improved over the typical supervisor-only evaluation.
Results across these studies show that
individuals generally improve their performance following 360-degree feedback,
at least in terms of subsequent ratings by the same observers. However, average
effect sizes generally appear to be modest. Most studies also show wide
variations in improvement across individuals.
As such, it is important to examine
personal or organizational factors that may moderate responses to multisource
feedback.
欸，學術的大挑戰：看出人家用的資料與方法能否適當地支撐其提出的論點（我果然只能看熱鬧）
Performance Measure
Behavior-Based
(Subjective) versus Results-Based (Objective)Measures
Turning to the first question, subjective
behavior-oriented measures (such as traditional PE ratings) offer a number of
potential advantages relative to results-based measures (Gerhart 2000).
First, they can be used for any type of
job.
Second, they permit the rater to factor in
variables that are not under the employee’s control but nevertheless influence
performance.
Third, they permit a focus on whether
results are achieved using acceptable means and behaviors.
Fourth, they generally carry less risk of
measurement deficiency, or the possibility that employees will focus only on
explicitly measured tasks or results at the expense of broader pro-social behaviors,
organizational citizenship behaviors, or contextual performance.
誤區與歧途
The subjectivity of behavior-oriented
measures limits their ability to differentiate employees (Murphy &
Cleveland 1995).
In addition, meta-analytic evidence finds a
mean interrater reliability of only 0.52 for performance ratings (Viswesvaran et al.
1996), making it difficult for organizations to justify differentiating
employees based on such error-laden performance measures (360-degree appraisals
may be helpful in this regard).
The subjectivity in these PE measures has
led the PE literature to focus on identifying cognitive biases in evaluation
(in hopes of reducing them) and examining how various features of PE measures
(and PE-related processes) influence employees’ perceptions of fairness (in
hopes of improving PE’s legitimacy and effectiveness; e.g., Folger & Konovsky 1989).
相對的成果論的問題
Results-oriented measures of performance,
such as productivity, sales volume, shareholder return, and profitability,
would seem to provide an antidote to the subjectivity and unreliability of
performance ratings.
Nevertheless, such measures are not
available for most jobs, at least at the individual level. Moreover, agency
theory emphasizes that results-based plans (such as gain- or profit-sharing)
increase risk bearing among employees (Gibbons 1998).
The consequences of risk bearing may go
unnoticed when performance (e.g., profitability) is good and a PFP plan is
paying out, but can quickly become a major employee relations issue when
results decline and payoffs go down. If poor organizational results are
perceived as being strongly influenced by factors that are beyond employees’
control (e.g., poor decisions by top executives), feelings of injustice can be
strong.
Finally, even though results-based measures
are objective and possibly more reliable, they may also be more deficient as
indicators of the full domain of expected performance.
Individual versus Group
(or Collective) Performance
While the potential pitfalls of
individually based PFP are important, the literature is quite clear that
group-based plans also have their own drawbacks.
One is that most employees (at least in the
United States
Another is that this preference is
strongest among the most productive and achievement-oriented employees. This
means that group-based pay may also have unfavorable sorting effects, causing
the highest performers to choose alternative opportunities where individual
results will be rewarded more heavily. Yet another drawback has to do with
weakened incentive effects: “Unless the number of individuals in a group is
quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make
individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals
will not act to achieve their common or group interests”
Three Lessons Learned in This Article:
1.績效的評估與獎金的發放，都是一種取捨與抉擇，無法兩全；也是一種訊號，塑造公司的文化與讓適合的員工留下來。
2.績效評估與薪資福利制度都只是工具，這些工具能否發揮功能要視任務情境等因素，沒有一套標準。
3.人其實很可悲，如果不是樂在自己的工作，往往需要恐懼與貪婪所驅使(有時則是忌妒別人)，才會勤勞辦事不偷懶。
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