2016年2月20日 星期六

安全文化的進化與退化

是說講安全文化的很多(特別是一些外商公司),國內也有不少從事安全文化與氣候研究的老師,理論陳述、組成構面與SEM model言之鑿鑿、合情合理 

然而就一個任職於本土公司的實務工作者鄉民而言,總感覺「夏蟲不可語冰」=>

有如冰塊的安全文化與氣候,對於我這隻壽命短暫、沒見過冬天的昆蟲而言,難以想像與理解

 
任職外商的先進們,從一些制度與實務作為來闡述何謂安全文化

專家學者們,利用問卷量表與線性結構方程式來闡述與衡量安全文化與氣候 

在以上先進與專家的分享和指導下,關於安全文化與氣候的樣貌(“What” is safety culture),大家已經得到不錯的觀念與認知 

然而,如何建構得到(How)安全文化與氣候,進而讓兩光組織不要三不五時出事,則是一個尚待努力的大哉問與大災問:
 

標竿公司說:效法我們的作法就對了
謎之兩光公司聲:X的勒,最好有那麼多的外國時間與資源 

教授學者說:要按部就班,第一步要先用心理問卷量表衡量大家的想法與心態
謎之兩光員工音:X,這是在問什麼鬼?反應那麼多老闆還不是只看錢?

 

 

 

就一個冥頑不靈的無神論鄉民而言,那些搞行為安全與安全文化的人,有時像是賣弄專有抽象名詞的神棍。 

就草包工人的觀點,安全要的不過是大家重視與參與罷了 

如果公司平常沒出什麼重大職災與火災爆炸,為什麼要大家浪費時間重視安全? 

如果公司的危害來自於製程與化學品的危害,在公司門口貼上「安全第一」+每天上班呼口號「安全第一」,就能夠防止製程的run away與設備機率性的failure?

工廠現場是個變動的環境,效法了外商的那套PSMMOC就能永保安康嗎?

許多的規章制度看似美輪美奐、盡善盡美,然而推動與維繫這些規章制度卻要違背人性與對抗熱力學第二定律
(很多公司的規章制度都是看起來嚇鼠人、做出來笑鼠人….)
 

學術界花時間在爭辯與修改安全文化/氣候的定義與構面,可是對於實務界而言「What is safety culture」這個問題一點都不重要、無關緊要 

重要的是: How

1.如何無中生有,讓組織建立起重視安全的集體意識?

2.哪些組織有機會建立起這種重視安全的集體意識?那些組織沒有建構安全文化的機會?兩者條件、原因與差異的比較?

3.如何維繫這份集體重視安全的氛圍,不要隨著時間過去而退化?
 

以上問題才是真正應該去關注與研究的議題,而非賣弄SEMHLM
 

Hint:
人口密度、土地面積決定了一個島嶼的政治、經濟與社會的組織型態-槍砲、病菌與鋼鐵-人類的命運 

放到企業公司上,是否產業的生產特性(craft, mass continuous, repetitive, 知識創意服務)、市場規模與毛利率也會dominate其中公司的組織與文化?

每家公司的組織與文化雖然是隨著時間演化的結果,但受到其產業背景脈絡的影響?(不同產業有其適合的組織形態與文化)

以上公司的組織形態與文化/價值觀,再進一步影響到組織的安全文化與氣候 

再就熱力學第二定律的詛咒來看,安全文化的建立與維繫需要耗費組織大量的能量與心力,那麼:
什麼樣的情境,才會讓組織投入不斷心力讓其安全水準維持在高檔的均衡(而非隨著時間逐步退化) 


以下為鄙人猜想

1.製程先天危害大,一不小心就會出大事而且也三不五時不斷出事(不斷提醒大家必須重視安全)

2.產品毛利率高(高風險高報酬),才有餘力能夠投資安全

3.公司熬過創業期成為大型甚至跨國企業,內控與管理水準,隨著組織成長而提升。

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The Evolution of Safety Culture


摘錄:

Following a nuclear accident at Chernobyl after the first analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the term safety culture got introduced. After which, investigations had been carried out on the King Cross disasters, train crash and Piper Alpha inquiry and conclusions were reached that these problems did not occur because of policies and procedures in force but rather because of the safety climate and culture within the safety management system put in place (ACSNI,1993).

Thus, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, safety culture is that grouping of characteristics and approaches present in individuals and organizations which represent paramount priority (Reason, 1997). It can be seen from the above definition that all organizations do have a safety culture but only those organizations that take safety to be their prevailing priority attain safety culture.

安全文化這個詞,從負面批判的而言,可謂只是一坨構念與概念的大雜燴,組織所有的一切問題都是安全文化的問題,有說等於沒說。

真不知當年國際核能總署調查車諾比核災時,不知調查委員會中的哪位先進(還是後來大家的加油添醋與以訛傳訛)率先用了這個詞,誘導了後來的思維與風潮

In a responsible organization, everyone should be responsible for safety. In other words, employees should feel at ease to walk up to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to report any problem to safety. To develop safety culture takes time and it is a continuous process. Actually, safety culture should start with organization’s senior management concern and support by providing resources to put into safety. At the start, organizations to impregnate safety culture make use of safety awareness, posters, and warning signs. Later on, programs are organized to address physical hazards and safety committees are formed.

 

Organizations are made up of four levels namely the executive and senior management, middle managers, supervisors and eventually the work teams like designers, maintenance, engineers, contractors, technicians and other workers who are under supervisors. As seen in our previous literature, safety culture evaluated from the Chernobyl action that needed to be urgently addressed. If improperly managed, the different levels of organizations will be affected differently

呵呵,老外也是人,會勾心鬥角,上有政策、下有對策,上下交賊/扭曲績效指標是組織內的常態(無需大驚小怪)

 

As per the model of Prochaska and Diclementi (1995), organizations develop safety culture as follows:

 

Precontemplation: a stage where beliefs prime and to bring change is not yet decided. Management thinks that sufficient changes that had to be made have already been done. That is the occupational safety and health programs put in place are far enough to ensure a good safety culture.

 

Contemplation: a stage in which it is seen that there should be realistic improvement, but there is no change in behavior from the management with any resolution taken.

 

Preparation is when management starts defining and devising steps to implement a healthy safety culture. In this stage, communication starts among team meetings, safety and health committees, schemes from safety and health representatives. Existing information on accident and incidents, absenteeism, hazards and risks and other occupational safety and health programs are taken into consideration.

 

Action: it is the stage where devised steps from the preparation stage are being put to action to ensure safety is being anchored at the work place at different levels, as per the budget available.

 

Maintenance is the final stage in which management reviews the action plan and maintains values and beliefs in order to ensure the continuity of the desired outcome.

其實不管是什麼組織都會經歷過以上階段與循環

得過且過、多一事不如少一事

出事之後,頭痛醫頭、治標不治本

再度出事(會深入一點頭痛醫腳)或回到坐以待斃的階段

因應事故提出改善方案與管控作為,隨著時間過去荒廢或隨著改朝換代人亡政息

回到坐以待斃、等待出事的均衡水準與狀態

 

安全文化的進化roadmap 


圖片出處:http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Company_Safety_Culture_(OGHFA_BN)

Safety culture can range along a line from not really caring about safety than being caught in unsafe acts known as pathological; through calculative which means following blindly steps to perform a task; to finally generative, where safety aspect is regarded into each hierarchy of the structure of the organization ( Westrum, 1993; 1997; 1999; La Porte and Consolini, 1991). In later stages, safety culture can only be seen along this line. In the pathological and part of the calculative stages, safety is regarded as being formal and frivolous rather than being an intrinsic part of the total culture of how things run in the organizations.

In the pathological stage, it is clearly seen that safety is not viewed as something important for the organization and lots of initiative have to be taken in order to boost up safety. According to Westrum (1999), information is not disclosed as it should be, responsibilities towards safety are bypassed, failures are hidden, new ideas to involve safety are rejected and union among employees is discouraged.
The next stage is one in which the importance of safety starts being noticed after having met with several incidents. However management still has doubt about incidents, accidents and near misses are being caused due to carelessness, inattention, horse playing among fellow employees. Most of the time, signals are sent to the top of the hierarchy and often they are ignored. According to management, new ideas is thought to bring problems, responsibilities are being broken, bridging is still discouraged (Westrum, 1999)

Lastly, generative stage is where safety needs are assessed, recognized and taken care of. It is found that simple acts, conditions and having incidents or occurrence, cost the organization lots of financial cost as well as image deterioration. Quantitative risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis are conducted to test new ideas given. In this stage, information is accepted together with new ideas, failures are investigated and measures taken to stop incidents, bridging is encouraged and rewarded and responsibilities are shared to ensure safety (Westrum, 1999).

欸,世上哪有那麼美好的事情,可以步步高升
學如逆水行舟,不進則退,安全文化亦同
走兩步、退一步,再走兩步,再退一步,能夠緩步向前/不要打回原形砍掉重練,已屬難得


身為環安從業人員,本來就是該面對大家不(重視)環保也(重視)不安全的事實

如果大家很重視工安,那麼也就不需要工安人員了




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