2015年10月24日 星期六

HRM Architecture (2)

這集來看$與績效評估

很多人資實務工作人員(受到老闆影響還是學校教的錯誤觀念?) 眼中只有$沒有人

 

 

 

Six Dangerous Myths About Pay
Jeffrey Pfeffer 

 

Every day, organizational leaders confront decisions about pay.
Should they adjust the company's compensation system to encourage some set of behaviors? Should they retain consultants to help them implement a performance-based pay system?
How large a raise should they authorize? 

In general terms, these kinds of questions come down to four decisions about compensation:
  •  how much to pay employees;
  • how much emphasis to place on financial compensation as a part of the total reward system;
  • how much emphasis to place on attempting to hold down the rate of pay; and
  •  whether to implement a system of individual incentives to reward differences in performance and productivity and, if so, how much emphasis to place on these incentives.

 
 
 
 
Labor rates often appear to be a company's most malleable financial variable. It seems a lot quicker and easier to cut wages than to control costs in other ways, like reconfiguring manufacturing processes, changing corporate culture, or altering product design. Because labor costs appear to be the lever closest at hand, managers mistakenly assume it is the one that has the most leverage.
呵,老闆如果只會算錢,底下精明的經理人也會耍手段(呈現自己的績效),而基層員工也不是笨蛋一樣會算(絕大多數的員工是正職的肉體,Subcontractor的心靈)
賺錢難,用錢買到人心更難
Most merit-pay systems share two attributes: they absorb vast amounts of management time and make everybody unhappy.
欸,我之所以能把工作做好,是因為:
1.老闆不懂/不管(沒有妨礙我自得其樂)
2.公司人資自知自己在裝模作樣(假裝有在管,其實也沒礙事)
3.老天保佑(惜福感謝好運)
4.低調自我修煉(安貧樂道,自求人間道)
5.有自知的智慧,不妨礙夥伴做好本份
 
If you could reliably measure and reward individual contributions, organizations wouldn’t be needed.
成敗與權責的因果太複雜,所以才需要彼此信賴的大家組成團體,凡事如果都可以論功行賞、把每樣任務與績效進行拆解記點計分,那麼組織不會存在、也不需要組織(所以工作都外包就好,目前走上此一歧途的組織正是傳授知識與智慧的大專院校)
First, much to the surprise of people who have spent too much time reading economics, empirical evidence from numerous studies indicates that the extent of free riding is quite modest.
Second, individuals do not make decisions about how much effort to expend in a social vacuum; they are influenced by peer pressure and the social relations they have with their workmates.
Enchantment with individual merit pay reflects not only the belief that people won't work effectively if they are not rewarded for their individual efforts but also the related view that the road to solving organizational problems is largely paved with adjustments to pay and measurement practices.
360度績效考核是萬靈丹還是毒藥?
 
作者的建議
The first, and perhaps most obvious, suggestion is that managers would do well to keep the difference between labor rates and labor costs straight. In doing so, remember that only labor costs and not labor rates - are the basis for competition, and that labor costs may not be a major component of total costs.
In any event, managers should remember that the issue is not just what you pay people, but also what they produce.
不要只看付出的人事成本,要想想這些人的產出與效益
Managers should see what happens when they include a large dose of collective rewards in their employees' compensation package. The more aggregated the unit used to measure performance, the more reliably performance can be assessed. One can tell pretty accurately how well an organization, or even a subunit, has done with respect to sales, profits, quality, productivity, and the like. Trying to parcel out who, specifically, was responsible for exactly how much of that productivity, quality, or sales is frequently much more difficult or even impossible.
評量的應該是整個單位的績效,而非個人的貢獻(組織中的每個人是interdependent,無法分割單獨評量單獨個體的貢獻;衡量單獨的貢獻就會造成分工不合作!)
Pay cannot substitute for a working environment high on trust, fun, and meaningful work. If you came for money, you would leave for money, and you wanted employees who were there because they liked the work, the culture, and the people, not money-that every company could offer. Emphasizing pay as the primary reward encourages people to come and to stay for the wrong reason.
公司不要窮得只剩錢!應該要有文化、工作樂趣與讓人舒服的同事與環境好高的期許與理想
Managers must also recognize that pay has substantive and symbolic components. In signaling what and who in the organization is valued, pay both reflects and helps determine the organization's culture. Therefore, managers must make sure that the messages sent by pay practices are intended. Managers must make sure that the messages sent by pay practices are intended. Talking about teamwork and cooperation and then not having a group-based component to the pay system matters because paying solely on an individual basis signals what the organization believes is actually
important-individual behavior and performance.
欸,很多老闆只是窮得只剩錢的老粗….不要只當灑錢的員外,給錢要說清楚原因,才能導正員工與孩子的價值觀
Making pay practices public also sends a powerful symbolic message. Some organizations reveal pay distributions by position or level. A few organizations, actually make data on individual pay available to all members who are interested. Other organizations try to maintain a high level of secrecy about pay. What message do those organizations send? Keeping salaries secret suggests that the organization has something to hide or that it doesn't trust its people with the information. Moreover, keeping things secret just encourages people to uncover the secrets-if something is worth hiding, it must be important and interesting enough to expend effort discovering. Pay systems that are more open and transparent send a positive message about the equity of the system and the trust that the company places in its people.
薪資及級距對於員工是很重要的資訊,資訊越不公開,其實讓員工越不相信公司
Actually talking to people about what is important and why, rather than trying to send some subtle signals through the compensation system!
直接告訴員工什麼是老闆與公司在意的,而非讓員工透過誰升官與加薪的決策來猜想
Perhaps most important, leaders must come to see pay for what it is: just one element in a set of management practices that can either build or reduce commitment, teamwork, and performance.
公司老闆自己要省思(而非讓人資奴才爬到金主頭上,然而有能力駕馭貌似專業人資奴才的主子並不多…)薪水付出去到底換到了什麼?塑造什麼樣的組織文化與價值觀
 
追隨使用一般normal人資作法與觀念的公司不可能賺取abnormal的報酬。
 
Three Lessons Learned in This Article:
1.人資不是做得越多用細膩越好,而是不用虛耗能量在空轉與誤謬上
2.重點不是錢或成本,而是人=>用錢買到+套牢人心,再經由這些人的向心力來成就事業與塑造競爭優勢!
3.賺錢難省錢難(do thing right),懂得用錢更難(do the right thing)
 
 
 
Performance Evaluation and Pay for Performance
Sara L. Rynes; Barry Gerhart; Laura Parks
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2005. 56:571–600
 
Three Motivation Theories
Maslow’s need hierarchy theory (1943)
Maslow hypothesized that these higher-order needs are more likely to be met through engagement in meaningful work than through monetary rewards. Although Maslow did not view need satisfaction as an all-or-nothing process (i.e., a person could simultaneously be motivated to varying degrees by needs at different levels), the expectation was that on average, all people progress through the hierarchy in roughly the same manner, and that as people move up the hierarchy, pay becomes less important.
必須透過金錢來滿足低層的安全需求
 
Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory(1957)
Herzberg posited that money was more likely to be a hygienic” factor—i.e., one capable of causing or reducing dissatisfaction—than a satisfying or motivating one. Thus, Herzberg believed that money played a role in creating or reducing dissatisfaction, but not in contributing to satisfaction or motivation.
金錢只是保健因子,錢能使人推磨、但無法使人誠心誠意
Deci & Ryan’s cognitive evaluation theory (CET, 1975)
CET argues that placing strong emphasis on monetary rewards is likely to decrease people’s intrinsic interest (i.e., interest in the work itself), thus dampening a potentially powerful alternative source of motivation. Deci and his colleagues have tended to argue that the net effect of monetary rewards on intrinsic interest is generally negative. However, Ryan et al. (1983) propose that the overall effects of pay on intrinsic interest depend on the information embedded in pay outcomes. Specifically, they argue that intrinsic interest is likely to be impaired to the extent that information about rewards is seen to be controlling. However, to the extent that pay provides meaningful information regarding self-competence in contexts where people have discretion in choosing how to perform tasks, then monetary rewards can actually increase intrinsic interest. Thus, in statements of CET theory that are more complex, the net effect of rewards on intrinsic interest depends on the relative impact of monetary rewards on perceived control versus perceived self-competence.
金錢獎勵可以傷害也可以促進內在動機/成就感(爭辯中)
以上三個理論能見度很高,但實證上存在疑慮
 
 
Split Roles” in Performance Evaluation
PE has two distinct functions: to develop employees through such mechanisms as feedback and goal setting, and to evaluate employees for purposes of making administrative decisions (e.g., pay increases or promotions; Murphy & Cleveland 1995). Meyer and colleagues (1965) argued that these two functions of performance appraisal should be kept completely separate from one another—that is, evaluations of performance and discussions of pay should be separated in time from discussions of how to improve (or “develop”) performance.
Interviews designed primarily to improve a person’s performance should not at the same time weigh his or her salary or promotion in the balance. . .. It seems foolish to have a manager serving the self-conflicting role as counselor (helping someone improve performance) when, at the same time, he or she is presiding as a judge over the same employee’s salary action” (Meyer et al. 1989, p. 26).
 
Kluger & DeNisi’s Feedback Intervention Theory
FIs change the locus of attention among 3 general and hierarchically organized levels of control: task learning, task motivation, and meta-tasks (including self-related) processes. The results suggest that FI effectiveness decreases as attention moves up the hierarchy closer to the self and away from the task. These findings are further moderated by task characteristics that are still poorly understood
績效評估能否提升績效取決脈絡因素(當事人人格特質,管理風格)、任務情境(已知未知、能否自己決定目標或控制成敗)
 



 

Multisource (360-Degree) Performance Evaluation Research

Multi source feedback is seen as potentially more useful than supervisor only evaluations in modern-day work environments, which increasingly incorporate team-based production, organizational structures that are more flat, and work organized around horizontal rather than vertical flows. In addition, because 360-degree feedback is gathered from multiple individuals, feedback reliability and validity may be substantially improved over the typical supervisor-only evaluation.

Results across these studies show that individuals generally improve their performance following 360-degree feedback, at least in terms of subsequent ratings by the same observers. However, average effect sizes generally appear to be modest. Most studies also show wide variations in improvement across individuals.

As such, it is important to examine personal or organizational factors that may moderate responses to multisource feedback.

欸,學術的大挑戰:看出人家用的資料與方法能否適當地支撐其提出的論點(我果然只能看熱鬧)

 

Performance Measure

Behavior-Based (Subjective) versus Results-Based (Objective)Measures

Turning to the first question, subjective behavior-oriented measures (such as traditional PE ratings) offer a number of potential advantages relative to results-based measures (Gerhart 2000).

First, they can be used for any type of job.

Second, they permit the rater to factor in variables that are not under the employee’s control but nevertheless influence performance.

Third, they permit a focus on whether results are achieved using acceptable means and behaviors.

Fourth, they generally carry less risk of measurement deficiency, or the possibility that employees will focus only on explicitly measured tasks or results at the expense of broader pro-social behaviors, organizational citizenship behaviors, or contextual performance.

誤區與歧途
The subjectivity of behavior-oriented measures limits their ability to differentiate employees (Murphy & Cleveland 1995).

In addition, meta-analytic evidence finds a mean interrater reliability of only 0.52 for performance ratings (Viswesvaran et al. 1996), making it difficult for organizations to justify differentiating employees based on such error-laden performance measures (360-degree appraisals may be helpful in this regard).

The subjectivity in these PE measures has led the PE literature to focus on identifying cognitive biases in evaluation (in hopes of reducing them) and examining how various features of PE measures (and PE-related processes) influence employees’ perceptions of fairness (in hopes of improving PE’s legitimacy and effectiveness; e.g., Folger & Konovsky 1989).

相對的成果論的問題
Results-oriented measures of performance, such as productivity, sales volume, shareholder return, and profitability, would seem to provide an antidote to the subjectivity and unreliability of performance ratings.

Nevertheless, such measures are not available for most jobs, at least at the individual level. Moreover, agency theory emphasizes that results-based plans (such as gain- or profit-sharing) increase risk bearing among employees (Gibbons 1998).

The consequences of risk bearing may go unnoticed when performance (e.g., profitability) is good and a PFP plan is paying out, but can quickly become a major employee relations issue when results decline and payoffs go down. If poor organizational results are perceived as being strongly influenced by factors that are beyond employees’ control (e.g., poor decisions by top executives), feelings of injustice can be strong.

Finally, even though results-based measures are objective and possibly more reliable, they may also be more deficient as indicators of the full domain of expected performance.

 

Individual versus Group (or Collective) Performance

While the potential pitfalls of individually based PFP are important, the literature is quite clear that group-based plans also have their own drawbacks.

One is that most employees (at least in the United States) prefer that their pay be based on individual rather than group performance.

Another is that this preference is strongest among the most productive and achievement-oriented employees. This means that group-based pay may also have unfavorable sorting effects, causing the highest performers to choose alternative opportunities where individual results will be rewarded more heavily. Yet another drawback has to do with weakened incentive effects: “Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”



Three Lessons Learned in This Article:
1.績效的評估與獎金的發放,都是一種取捨與抉擇,無法兩全;也是一種訊號,塑造公司的文化與讓適合的員工留下來。
2.績效評估與薪資福利制度都只是工具,這些工具能否發揮功能要視任務情境等因素,沒有一套標準。
3.人其實很可悲,如果不是樂在自己的工作,往往需要恐懼與貪婪所驅使(有時則是忌妒別人),才會勤勞辦事不偷懶。
 

沒有留言: